ASEAN Centrality at the Crossroads: Navigating Great Power Competition in the Indo-Pacific

By Aghnia Nadhira Aliya Putri

The Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly contested, and ASEAN now stands at a pivotal moment in its diplomatic history. As tensions between the United States and China intensify, the principle of "ASEAN Centrality" faces perhaps its greatest test yet. This concept—that Southeast Asian nations collectively should drive regional cooperation mechanisms—has underpinned the region's diplomatic architecture for decades. But can it survive in today's more polarized geopolitical environment?

Researching ASEAN's evolving role in regional security, what's clear is that the days of comfortable strategic ambiguity are numbered. ASEAN established forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum in the 1990s and later the East Asia Summit, the organization successfully positioned itself as the fulcrum of regional diplomacy. Major powers accepted these ASEAN-led platforms because the post-Cold War environment permitted such inclusive approaches.

This cooperative geopolitical world is vanishing before our eyes. The Quad dialogue between the US, Japan, India and Australia has been revitalized. The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership emerged seemingly overnight in 2021. Both initiatives operate entirely outside ASEAN frameworks. As Ambassador Elizabeth Buensuceso, Philippines' Eminent Person to the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Community's Post-2045 Vision and author of "ASEAN Centrality: An Autoethnographic Account by a Philippine Diplomat," emphasized during a panel discussion at the Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya on October 23, 2024, "ASEAN Centrality is an important but oft-misunderstood concept" that requires continuous effort to maintain in practice rather than merely in rhetoric.

The region's economic reality further complicates matters. Trade figures from the ASEAN Secretariat show China's economic footprint has grown enormously, with bilateral trade reaching $878 billion in 2023. For comparison, US-ASEAN trade, while substantial, remains significantly smaller. This economic gravitational pull creates leverage that Beijing isn't shy about using.

Meanwhile, most Southeast Asian nations still look to America for security reassurance, especially those with claims in the South China Sea. This creates the strategic dilemma at the heart of ASEAN's challenge: economically pulled toward China while security concerns push toward the US. Notable exceptions exist, with Cambodia and to a lesser extent Thailand showing stronger alignment with Beijing on both economic and security fronts.

ASEAN's traditional approach—engaging all powers while committing to none—has delivered mixed results. Yes, the organization has maintained dialogue with China on a South China Sea Code of Conduct. But negotiations have dragged on for over two decades with little concrete progress. The consensus-driven approach that defines ASEAN has often produced lowest-common-denominator outcomes that satisfy nobody.

The Myanmar crisis since 2021 has further exposed ASEAN's limitations. The organization's "Five-Point Consensus" plan quickly unravelled as the military junta ignored its commitments. As Professor Amitav Acharya noted in a recent article, "ASEAN faces challenges not just from great power competition but from its internal divisions and inconsistent application of its own principles."

So what's the way forward? From my analysis, four approaches could help ASEAN maintain relevance:

First, ASEAN must get its own house in order. Indonesia and Vietnam, with their respective economic and strategic weight, need to drive stronger internal cohesion. Disunity is ASEAN's Achilles' heel, repeatedly exploited by outside powers. States have begun overcoming historical animosities through increased people-to-people exchanges, joint development projects, and careful diplomacy on sensitive bilateral issues—particularly evident in Vietnam-Philippines cooperation on South China Sea matters despite past tensions. Second, ASEAN should rethink its decision-making processes. The "ASEAN Minus X" formula, which allows some initiatives to proceed without universal participation, should be applied more broadly to prevent paralysis on critical issues.

Third, middle power diplomacy offers promising avenues. Deeper partnerships with countries like Japan, Australia, South Korea and India can provide ASEAN with additional strategic options. Kishore Mahbubani has convincingly argued that "middle power cooperation gives ASEAN breathing room between the superpowers."

Fourth, institutional capacity needs urgent strengthening. The ASEAN Secretariat operates on a shoestring budget of roughly $25 million annually—according to Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta's research—a fraction of what's needed given its responsibilities.Perhaps counterintuitively, the US-China competition actually presents opportunities. Rather than becoming passive terrain for great power rivalry, ASEAN can position itself as an essential bridge in areas where cooperation remains possible—climate change, pandemic prevention, or trade facilitation.

The question isn't whether ASEAN Centrality will survive exactly as before—it won't. The question is whether ASEAN can adapt this principle to fit a more contested region. Southeast Asia's 660 million people deserve more than to become pawns in a great power chess match.

ASEAN's diplomatic centrality was never guaranteed; it was built through creative diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. Similar creativity—with greater urgency and pragmatism—is needed now if Southeast Asian nations wish to maintain agency in shaping their region's future.

References

Acharya, A. (2023). ASEAN and Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 45(2), 178-196.

ASEAN Investment Report. (2024). Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN 2023. ASEAN Secretariat.

ASEAN Stats. (2024). ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2023. ASEAN Secretariat.

CSIS. (2023). Strengthening ASEAN Centrality: Institutional Capacity Building in a Changing Regional Architecture. Center for Strategic and International Studies Jakarta.

Buensuceso, E. (2024). ASEAN Centrality: An Autoethnographic Account by a Philippine Diplomat. Panel discussion at "Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN: Perspectives from the Field," Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya, 23 October 2024.

Mahbubani, K. (2022). Has ASEAN Been Effective in Managing Great Power Competition? East Asia Forum Quarterly, 14(1), 10-12.

Aghnia Nadhira Aliya Putri (PhD Double Degree Candidate)

School of Business and Management, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Indonesia

Center for Business and Society, Coventry University, United Kingdom